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Introduction 
Profession-independent supervision is seen as essential instrument to restore public 
confidence in auditing in the aftermath of past accounting scandals. The 
establishment of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) in the 
U.S. set in motion a powerful process of coercive and mimetic isomorphism, in which 
course, formally independent audit oversight systems mushroomed around the 
globe. This study provides first insights into the question as to how independent 
“independent” audit oversight boards are. 
The role of independent audit regulation is a recurring theme in accounting research 
(Humphrey et al., 2009, 2011; Suddaby et al., 2007). However, a systematic and 
encompassing comparison of the intertwining of audit regulators and the accounting 
profession has not yet been provided. So far, research on audit regulation is 
characterised by comparative studies incorporating a rather small and highly 
selective number of countries (Baker et al., 2001; Eldaly, 2012; Evans and Nobes, 
1998; Puxty et al., 1987), and by qualitative case studies focusing on single countries 
(Baker et al., 2006; Canning and O’Dwyer, 2013; Caramanis et al., 2015; 
Jonnergard, 2012; Malsch and Gendron, 2011; Öhman and Wallerstedt, 2012). 
Hence, there is a lack of comparative data on the configuration of oversight systems 
and the diverse understanding of “independent oversight” across different 
jurisdictions. As a result, there is a paradoxical gap between the high relevance 
attributed to independent regulation and the empirical findings on the way in which 
this new regulatory paradigm has been translated into regulatory outcomes.  
This study fills the research gap by offering a methodological operationalisation for 
measuring the level of independence of audit oversight structures by using an 
analytical framework for the first time. By comparing 28 different oversight systems, 
this paper at the same time responds to calls for more cross-country audit research 
to advance the knowledge about various forms of public oversight systems 
(Humphrey and Moizer, 2008; Maijoor and Vanstraelen, 2012). On this way, the 
study provides a point of reference when referring to the “independent regulator”; an 
anchor, needed for current debates on further regulatory reforms and audit research 
on the relationship between the regulator’s action and its formal institutional design.  
Comparative analysis requires comparable data. To guarantee the study’s validity, 
data was collected in two ways. First, an email questionnaire was sent to all 28 
European oversight authorities in November 2013. The questionnaire focused on the 
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legal provisions of the independence dimensions used for this study. By March 2014, 
answers were received from 22 oversight authorities.1 Second, all national provisions 
on the compositions and responsibilities of the audit oversight systems were 
collected and analysed. Other sources of information were data from the website of 
the International Forum of Independent Audit Regulators (IFIAR) (www.ifiar.org), 
along with the official websites of the oversight boards and their annual reports. The 
list of regulators is presented in the Appendix 1. The findings of the various sources 
were compared with each other and directly translated to the coding scheme.2 The 
validity of the final results was cross-checked by other auditing scholars and by 
various oversight authorities to which the results have been provided. 
The PCAOB is added to the European sample given its pivotal role in shaping audit 
regulation on the global landscape. Its establishment triggered various rounds of 
regulatory reforms in the European Union, starting in 2006, when an EU Directive 
(2006/43/EC) required European member states to implement independent oversight 
systems. In addition, the PCAOB set other countries directly under pressure by 
pointing out that only the establishment of “equivalent” oversight bodies would avoid 
extraterritorial PCAOB inspections. Complete independence is thereby seen by the 
PCAOB as the essential criteria for determining whether the PCAOB can rely on a 
non-U.S. oversight system, to conduct inspections of PCAOB-registered non-U.S. 
audit firms (e.g. PCAOB Chief of Staff Ross, 2004) 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the the 
methodology used for the analysis of oversight independence. Based on the 
developed coding system, the third section illustrates and compares the 
independence values of all oversight systems. Conclusions and suggestions for 
future research follow.  
Methodology 
Regulatory independence 
Following Majone (1997), independence can be conceptualised as an entity’s 
autonomy in decision-making (Majone, 1997). Autonomy, in turn, is the ability to 
translate one’s own preferences into authoritative actions without external constraints 
(Busuioc, 2009; Maggetti, 2007). Independence is therefore defined as the autonomy 
of the oversight entity to self-determine its preferences and to make use of its 
regulatory competences, without constraints from the accounting profession, during 
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the activity of regulation. Moreover, it is important to distinguish between formal 
independence and de-facto independence. Formal independence describes the 
status of an agency according to the legal acts that constitute and govern the 
agency. It is the key factor when investigating delegation to regulatory agencies as it 
corresponds to the intentions of the decision-makers with regard to providing 
credibility to regulatory policies (Maggetti, 2007). De-facto (e.g. actual) independence 
refers to the degree to which the oversight authority operates independently from the 
audit profession in practice (Hanretty and Koop, 2012, 2013; Maggetti, 2007). This 
study assesses the formal independence of the audit oversight systems. The 
country’s politico-administrative tradition or other non-legal determinants (i.e. policy 
style or administrative culture) of de-facto independence are therefore outside the 
scope of this paper. Acknowledging the possible interferences of other factors does 
not mean that formal independence is immaterial. On the contrary, various scholars 
trace actual independence back to formal independence (Furlong, 1998; Hanretty 
and Koop, 2013; Hayo and Voigt, 2007; Verhoest et al., 2010).  
This paper’s index of formal independence is based on the construction of two 
profiles for each oversight system. While the Organisational Profile takes into 
account the organisational structures, the Functional Profile relates to the regulatory 
competences of the oversight authorities. With the results of these profiles, it is then 
possible to create one index of independence that considers both the organisational 
and the functional independence equally. For each country the arithmetic mean of 
the organisational and functional profile is calculated in order to set up a ranking 
regarding the degree of material independence of the oversight systems. Each profile 
is based on several variables and each variable is associated with several indicators, 
which are numerically coded on a scale of 0 (lowest level of independence) to 3 
(highest level of independence).3 It could reasonably be argued that various variables 
could be weighted differently, for instance, by performing a qualitative assessment of 
their relative importance a priori. At this point in the study, each variable has been 
attributed with the same weight, thus, implicitly, the same relevance.4  
The identification of the variables is based on two pillars. First, it takes into account 
prior studies on independence of regulatory entities. A measurement tool for 
independence has been developed for investigating the independence from political 
interferences of banks (Cukierman et al., 1992; Cukierman and Webb, 1995), the 
telecommunications market (Edwards and Waverman, 2006; Tenbücken and 
Schneider, 2004) and courts (Hayo and Voigt, 2007; Smithey and Ishiyama, 2000). 
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Other scholars have analysed the level of independence of regulatory agencies of 
various sectors within one country (Elgie and McMenamin, 2005) or among several 
countries (Gilardi, 2002, 2005; Hanretty and Koop, 2013). To link public policy 
research to the specific field of audit regulation, the definition of the International 
Forum of Independent Audit Regulators (IFIAR) and the European Commission 
about the core principles of an “independent” audit oversight system has been taken 
into account as a second pillar for the identification for the relevant independence 
variables. The IFIAR consists of audit regulators from a total of 50 jurisdictions. The 
organisation seeks to promote effective independent audit oversight through 11 core 
principles, which provide guidance to governments to establish effective and 
independent audit oversight systems.5 By matching public policy research and the 
definition of audit oversight independence of the IFIAR and the European Union, the 
study’s measurement validity can be secured. 
Organisational Profiles 
The analysis of the Organisational Profiles of the public oversight systems is based 
on a total of ten variables (Table 1). Seven out of the ten variables are mentioned in 
the IFIAR principles on independent audit oversight. Three have been additionally 
added based on prior literature on independence. The ten variables measure the 
essential organisational features of the oversight boards and represent control 
relations between the accounting profession and the oversight board, such as the 
procedures foreseen for the appointment of the oversight board members and the 
oversight head, the existence or not of special cooling-off provisions, the employment 
status of the board members, and provisions on the terms of office. The latter is 
based on literature which argues that non-renewable and fixed-term mandates 
promote independence by eliminating the possibility that members exercise 
regulatory power strategically (Edwards and Waverman, 2006; Tenbücken and 
Schneider, 2004). They also measure the extent of influence of professional bodies 
on the nomination procedure and whether practitioners are involved in the 
governance of the board. Finally, it is analysed whether the oversight system is 
organised as a single-sector or a multi-sector jurisdiction. Scholars suggest that a 
multi-sector agency provides better protection from industry capture as interest 
groups compete against each other, and as the agency has facilitated access to 
pooled resources, improving its information-processing abilities (Edwards and 
Waverman, 2006; Maggetti, 2007; Tenbücken and Schneider, 2004). The coding 
 5 
values for the Organisational Profiles of each oversight system are stated in 
Appendix 4.  
Please insert Table 1 here 
Functional Profiles 
The Functional Profiles measure the extent to which the audit oversight regulators 
depend on the audit profession for conducting the vital elements of the oversight 
system (Table 2). Due to the high technical understanding that is needed in auditing, 
regulators have to balance between the need to cooperate with the audit profession 
and the necessary detachment, which is needed for an effective oversight system. 
The analysis of functional profiles of the public oversight systems is based on a total 
of five variables. The first variable focuses on the registration of audit firms. The 
second and third variables relate to the mode of external quality assurance, which 
particularly affects the degree to which oversight systems achieve their goal of 
protecting the interests of investors and the public. This relates to common criticism 
that professions are unwilling or unable to discipline their members (Bedard, 2001; 
Suddaby et al., 2007). The fourth variable relates to the authority for disciplinary 
measures in case errors or material weaknesses were identified in the inspections 
and the publication of the report, which is the fifth variable. The coding values for the 
Functional Profiles of each oversight system are stated in Appendix 5. 
Literature does not offer a fixed number of variables for the reliability of the scale. 
With regard to the POSAC analysis, optimal solutions are obtained with five to ten 
variables (Shye, 2009, p. 299). This is in line with the number of variables chosen in 
this study. 
Please insert Table 2 here 
Analytical approach  
The results are analysed and visualised with a Partial Order Scalogram Analysis with 
Coordinates (POSAC).6 The method is used because it does not only create an 
independence ranking, but also illustrates the large degree of variation, existing 
between the various oversight arrangements.  
POSAC is a specific form of multidimensional scalogram analysis that reduces the 
data of the objects from an N-dimensional space to a two dimensional space (in the 
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plot DIM (1) and DIM (2))7. It can therefore be compared with a Principal Component 
Analysis. However, while the latter tries to preserve distances, POSAC tries to 
preserve ordering. Thus, the underlying assumption of POSAC is that the geometric 
representation of order relations among objects, rather than the mathematical 
expression of items’ loadings on factors, may highlight patterns in the data that are 
not so apparent in factor analytic solutions. 
A partial order analysis begins with a number of criteria for differentiating an 
observed population basis; this is the so-called “facet theory”. Recently, the method 
has gained attention in the field of comparative politics, where it has been used as a 
powerful method of structural and comparative analysis (DeRosa et al., 2005; 
Schneider et al., 2005; Taylor, 2002). The basic idea behind facet theory is that every 
analytical object can be decomposed into a certain number of dimensions (facets) 
and each dimension can be decomposed into ordered values (Tenbücken and 
Schneider, 2004). A combination of different facets is a “structuple”; in this case, the 
profile of one oversight system. Each oversight system can thus be defined by its 
specific profile based on scores for each variable. Hence, an audit oversight profile is 
a row of the data matrix, which, in the current coding scheme, can range from 
{1111111111} through to {3333333333} (ten dimensions of the organizational profile 
which can take values from 1 to 3), with all combinations among these two extremes 
empirically possible. The method`s advantage is that it allows to distinguish between 
objects that have different values on different facets and thus show different 
institutional configurations, which enables the comparison of various objects and 
enables to structure a previously disorganised universe.  
POSAC adopts these principles and depicts all profiles in a two-dimensional space 
through a regioning process in which profiles with the same score on a struct are 
positioned closer together than profiles with different scores on that struct. In other 
words, similar audit oversight systems are close and dissimilar systems are distant 
from each other. At the same time, the two-dimensional space illustrates the degree 
of independence of the various systems. Profiles with the highest rank occupy the 
upper right-hand corner, those with the lowest rank, the left-hand corner (Guttmann 
and Greenbaum, 1998). In this way it is possible to measure the independence of 
oversight boards in both a quantitative and comparative way. 
Results 
Organisational Independence  
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Comparing all 28 profiles along a multidimensional scale, the analysis generates the 
topography illustrated in Figure 1.  
Please insert Figure 1 here 
The analysis of the various interrelations between the accounting profession and the 
regulatory authority reveals a mixed picture of how independence has been 
interpreted: although all of the European audit oversight bodies are formally 
independent from the accounting profession, there is not one single model to which 
all countries adhere. Countries lying closer to the upper right-hand corner show high 
levels of independence. Hence, Latvia, Luxembourg, Italy, and Hungary are identified 
as possessing the most independent oversight systems in terms of organisational 
independence from the accounting profession. The close positioning of the oversight 
systems of Luxembourg and Italy indicate similar institutional structures: they 
organise their audit oversight systems in the form of traditional regulatory agencies. 
Two indicators express the high organisational values of these countries in particular. 
First, one way of ensuring independence from the regulated industry is to maximise 
relational distance from the profession by excluding former employees of the 
accounting profession from being appointed as regulators, which is the case in these 
countries. Second, Italy and Luxembourg have multi-sector rather than single-sector 
agencies which offer greater independence than single-sector agencies. Hungary 
and Latvia have set up the oversight boards within the government, as a permanent 
internal structure of the Ministry of Finance (Latvia) and the Ministry for National 
Economy (Hungary). Hence, members of the oversight board are civil servants and 
employed directly by the ministries. 
 
Interestingly, Sweden shows that the organisation of the audit oversight system as a 
government authority does not necessarily result in high independence values. The 
Swedish Supervisory Board is a governmental authority under the Ministry of Justice 
and is governed by its director, who is appointed by the government. However, a 
closer look reveals that within its organisation the Supervisory Board has a separate 
decision-making body, the Oversight Board, which has decision authority in the field 
of disciplinary actions against audit firms, and which shows relatively low 
independence values, based on the lack of cooling-off requirements for the members 
of the Board and the involvement of practising auditors. This is in line with 
Jonnergard (2012), who draws attention to the country’s opaque regulatory system, 
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characterised by a strong regulatory intertwining between the state and the 
profession. 
 
Denmark presents a similar case. The official audit oversight authority is the Danish 
Business Authority (DBA), which is a regulatory agency under the Ministry of 
Business and Growth. However, the main responsible actor for quality assurance is 
the Danish Supervisory Authority on Auditing (DSAA). Although, the DSAA is an 
organisational entity within the DBA, its board consists of honorary members. The 
low independence value can furthermore be explained by the absence of cooling-off 
provisions and by the high number of accountants on the board: four out of nine 
members have to be approved auditors. 
 
The low independence value of the PCAOB is another striking finding. This is 
primarily due to the specific SOX provisions regarding the composition of the Board. 
First, two out of five members involved in the governance of the Board have to be 
certified public accountants. Second, only the chairman has to meet the cooling-off 
provisions stated in the SOX. The SOX restriction of the number of Certified Public 
Accountants on the Board to two members is perceived as an appropriate safeguard 
to avoid the Board being dominated by the regulated parties (Palmrose, 2013, p. 
778). Nevertheless this ratio is among the highest in terms of the involvement of 
accounting professionals, compared to the European provisions. Given that the 
Board is central to the way the PCAOB implements SOX provisions, one could, at 
least partially, question the role of the PCAOB as the globally accepted benchmark of 
an entirely independent regulator.  
 
The British Financial Reporting Council (FRC) became responsible for audit 
regulation in 2004. The FRC Board was a direct response to the developments in the 
U.S. (Eldaly, 2012), which is evidenced in relatively similar organisational structures, 
illustrated in the close positioning of the U.K. and the PCAOB in Figure 1. In contrast 
to other oversight authorities, only a majority of the overall 16 members of the Board 
must not be individuals who in the five years prior to appointment have been 
practising auditors. The average ranking in terms of organisational independence is 
mainly due to the fact that the profession funds half of the auditing and accounting 
costs of the FRC. This is in line with Eldaly (2012) who identified the dependence of 
the FRC's funding system on professional bodies as independence risk (Eldaly, 
2012, p. 130), and with the FRC’s perception that “the independence of the FRC as 
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oversight regulator for the audit profession is still governed by agreements with the 
profession that sometimes inappropriately limit its independence” (FRC, 2012, p. 11). 
 
Finland and Ireland are the countries with the lowest values. By the mid-1990s, in 
Ireland the regulatory reforms altered the institutional arrangements of the country’s 
self-regulatory system and established the Irish Auditing and Accounting Supervisory 
Authority (IAASA). While at the time of establishment the institutional arrangements 
were more extensive than those of the majority of European countries, the analysis 
indicates that the Irish system has not kept pace with international and European 
regulatory developments (see also Canning and O’Dwyer, 2014, p. 25). Finland, 
already in 1924, decided that the supervision of the profession should be carried out 
by an external actor and transferred the task of supervising the profession to the 
Central Chamber of Commerce, a private organization with companies as members 
(Niemi and Sundgren, 2008, pp. 80, 96). Although critical voices have called for the 
removal of the oversight from the Chamber to a pure governmental body, the 
Chamber has remained the primary responsible entity to this day. 
Functional Independence 
Comparing all 28 profiles along the multidimensional scale, the analysis shows the 
topography illustrated in Figure 2.  
Please insert Figure 2 here 
Figure 2 shows less variation than the figure of the organisational profiles, thus 
indicating that the European audit oversight systems differ less significantly in terms 
of regulatory competences. Moreover, it reveals a fundamental difference between 
organisational and functional independence. While no single oversight system 
reaches the highest possible value concerning institutional independence, there are 
various countries with extremely high functional independence values (e.g. the FRC, 
the Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (CONSOB) in Italy, the 
Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier (CSSF) in Luxembourg and the 
Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) in the Netherlands).  
The two extreme outliers here are Belgium and again Ireland. In both countries, the 
primary responsibility for all quality assurance of statutory auditors resides with the 
accountancy bodies that organise the inspections and issue penalties in the case of 
deficiency reports. As in Ireland, Belgium integrated external organizations, such as 
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the High Council for Economic Professions and other disciplinary bodies, into its 
oversight system before European law required the establishment of independent 
regulation. Observers therefore argued that the “Belgian profession was at the 
leading edge” with respect to external quality assurance (Vanstraelen and Willekens, 
2008, p. 36). However, the analysis illustrates a very low degree of functional 
independence of the Belgian regulator, which supports prior research that claimed 
that the Belgian oversight system was made under strong influence of the profession 
(Vanstraelen and Willekens, 2008).  
The Dutch system represents the counterexample, as the regulatory development 
took a very different course. Until 2006, no independent external oversight existed in 
the Dutch regulatory environment (Meuwissen and Wallage, 2008, p. 176). When, in 
2006, the Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) was declared as oversight body, 
the Dutch oversight system was transformed and regulatory power was transferred 
from the professional bodies to a purely regulatory agency.  
Material Independence 
With these results, it is possible to create one index of independence. For each 
country, the arithmetic mean is calculated from the POSAC values of the 
Organizational and Functional profiles in order to set up a rank order regarding the 
degree of material independence of the oversight systems (Appendix 3). For a 
graphical representation, the combined values are used to determine the positions of 
the systems on the y- and the x-axis of the diagram. The y-axis shows the combined 
values for the POSAC concerning the competences of the systems, the x-axis 
reveals the combined values for the organisational structure. In this diagram, the 
oversight systems with the highest level of independence are located in the upper 
right-hand corner.  
Please insert Figure 3 here 
The high variation—on both the y- and the x-axis—indicates that the oversight 
systems still differ significantly in terms of material independence. Countries with 
high independence values set up their oversight systems as administrative agencies 
(Hungary, Sweden) or as regulatory agencies (Luxembourg, Italy, the Netherlands).  
The latter approach was put into practice by either adding audit oversight as an 
additional task to an already existing financial market supervisory authority, or by 
 11 
establishing a new authority—which was the case of the PCAOB in the U.S. The 
essential feature of regulatory agencies is that the prime and final responsibilities are 
combined as they are responsible for all immediate operating tasks of public 
oversight. Hence, these agencies combine legislative, executive, and judicial 
functions, i.e. they define rules, supervise them, and introduce sanctions if 
necessary. In addition, these agencies have their own powers and responsibilities 
given under public law, are organisationally separated from ministries, and are 
neither directly elected nor managed by elected officials.  
Apart from Hungary and Sweden, the audit oversight systems in Denmark, Latvia, 
and Malta are also organised in the form of a regulatory authority equipped with its 
own resources and staff. These entities are organised as “governmental authorities” 
under the Ministry of Justice (Sweden), Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs 
(Denmark), and the Ministry for National Economy (Hungary), or belong to the 
internal structure of a ministry, as is the case in Latvia. Hence, this approach involves 
highly politicised bodies. However, as can be seen in Denmark, this does not 
necessarily result in regulatory structures without interference of the profession.  
Low material independence values can be found in particular for oversight systems 
that are either institutionalised as a monitored peer-review system or are situated 
within a chamber system (as is the case, for example, in Belgium, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Finland, France, Lithuania, and Poland). A professional chamber is a 
corporation under public law that exercises some degree of regulatory authority over 
the accounting profession. However, chambers also function as traditional interest 
groups, and the close interrelation with, and dependence on the accounting 
profession might jeopardise the regulators’ service for public interest.  
Conclusion  
Within the last decade, the audit regulation has changed significantly. By analysing 
the statutory provisions that describe the composition and the competences of audit 
oversight boards, this paper contributes empirically and methodologically to the on-
going debate on audit regulation. 
The methodological aim was to develop a framework to measure the degree of 
independence of the PCAOB and recently established oversight bodies in the 
European Union. To this end, this paper offers a detailed operationalisation of audit 
oversight independence, leading eventually to a single index of material 
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independence. The empirical and methodological contribution is necessary as legal 
arrangements represent the “starting point” (Busuioc, 2009, p. 603) for further 
comparative audit oversight research that aims at investigating how these formal 
rules have been evolved in regulatory practice. 
The empirical aim of this study was to shed light on the independence from the 
accounting profession of the various audit oversight authorities. In 2005, PCAOB 
member Daniel Goelzer said that “other countries have established (…) PCAOB-like 
inspection bodies. The days of unfettered self-regulation are coming to an end”  
(PCAOB founding member Daniel Goelzer, 2005). This study challenges this 
perception. Whereas all countries claim to possess formal independent oversight 
bodies, there is a visible gap between countries with comparatively strong 
independent oversight authorities, such as Italy and Luxembourg, and systems in 
which accounting bodies still maintain far-reaching regulatory influence, such as 
Ireland and Belgium.  
By representing initial insights about the current mode of audit regulation, this study 
is a first step in comparative audit oversight research, and therefore points out to 
various research questions to be addressed in the future. First, this study does not 
differentiate between different segments of the accounting profession. However, in 
the new era of “post-professionalism” (Suddaby et al., 2007, p. 356), large and 
globally operating accounting firms have started to disconnect themselves from the 
majority of local audit firms by following their own strategic and regulatory agenda 
(Cooper and Robson, 2006; Covaleski et al., 2003; Suddaby et al., 2007). As 
anecdotal evidence from data used in this study indicates, particular representatives 
of the Big4 are involved in the governance of the oversight authority and in the 
organization of audit inspections. Future research has therefore to focus on the 
possible side effects of the overrepresentation of the Big4 (and the 
underrepresentation of small auditors) in regulatory affairs on the local context.  
Second, further research should address the causes of significant variation of audit 
oversight structures. The analysis shows that some of the countries that 
implemented their oversight systems before the PCAOB came into existence, such 
as Ireland, Belgium, and Denmark, still possess public institutions that are close to 
the profession and have not left their chosen regulatory path. Further research could 
therefore elaborate on how relevant actors were able to secure this earlier mode of 
regulation and how these sectoral and national patters intervene with European 
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regulatory harmonisation efforts. More in-depth analytical case studies are required 
to identify the factors and motives shaping audit oversight arrangements. This is 
particularly important for those countries in which a strong interrelation between the 
oversight authorities and the accounting profession has been identified. Future 
research has to identify the ways and mechanisms that have enabled this specific 
understanding of regulation to remain accepted by the regulatory community of 




Notes   
                                                     
1 
The following countries did not respond to the research request: Spain, Slovenia, Portugal, 
Italy, Estonia and Cyprus. As it was neither possible to get in contact with the relevant 
authorities nor possible to identify the relevant regulatory provisions, the oversight board of 
Cyprus is not included in the analysis. The survey instrument can be received on request. 
 
2
 Two research assistants were involved in the data collection. The coding process (i.e. the 
translation of the collected materials into the coding scheme), was only made by the author.  
 
3
 This scale was used as the majority of variables had three indicators. In the case of four 
indicators, the scale was further differentiated (0.75 - 1.50 - 2.25 - 3.00). 
 
4
 Gilardi (2002) points out that combining and weighing variables is unavoidably arbitrary. To 
cut this Gordian knot, this study attributes the same weight to each variable, which was done 
by others (Gilardi, 2002; Tenbücken and Schneider, 2004). 
 
5
 Eldaly (2012) provides a useful analysis of the 11 core principles and their key features of 
the IFIAR (Eldaly, 2012, pp. 117–124).  
 
6
 For the analysis, the software SYSTAT, Version 12 was used.  
 
7
 Due to the reduction of ten dimensions to two, there is some error. The stress factor 
indicates that the percentage of the dimensions is not correctly represented after the 
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Appendix 1: National oversight authorities  
 
Austria  Austrian Auditors Supervisory Authority  
Belgium  High Council for Economic Professions 
Bulgaria  Commission for Public Oversight of Statutory Auditors  
Czech Republic Audit Public Oversight Council 
Croatia  Audit Public Oversight Committee  
Denmark Danish Supervisory Authority on Auditing  
Estonia  Auditors Activities Oversight Council  
Finland  Auditing Board of the Central Chamber of Commerce  
France  Haut Conseil du Commissariat aux Comptes  
Germany Auditor Oversight Commission  
Greece  Hellenic Accounting and Auditing Standards Oversight 
Hungary  Auditors’ Public Oversight Committee  
Italy  Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa  
Ireland  Irish Auditing & Accounting Supervisory Authority  
Latvia  The Authority of Audit and Accounting 
Lithuania The Authority of Auditing and Accounting  
Luxembourg Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier  
Malta  Quality Assurance Oversight Committee  
Netherlands Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets  
Poland  Audit Oversight Commission 
Portugal  National Audit Oversight Board  
Romania Council for the Public Oversight of the Activity of the Statutory Audit 
Slovakia  Auditing Oversight Authority  
Slovenia  Agency for Public Oversight of Auditing 
Spain  Accounting and Auditing Institute  
Sweden  Supervisory Board of Public Accountants 
United Kingdom Financial Reporting Council  








Appendix 2: Coding for Organisational Independence 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
AT 3.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 0.75 3.00 0.75 
BE 1.00 1.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.25 0.75 0.75 
BG 3.00 1.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 1.00 1.50 1.50 2.25 1.50 
HR 3.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 2.25 1.50 2.25 1.50 
CZ 2.25 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 1.50 0.75 3.00 0.75 
DK 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 0.75 0.75 2.25 0.75 
EE 3.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.50 2.25 2.25 0.75 
FI 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.50 0.75 1.50 0.75 
FR 0.75 1.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.50 0.75 3.00 0.75 
DE 0.75 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 2.25 2.25 3.00 
GR 1.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.25 0.75 1.50 0.75 
HU 3.00 3.00 3.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.25 1.88 1.88 
IE 1.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.75 1.88 0.75 
IT 2.25 3.00 3.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.75 3.00 3.00 
LV 3.00 1.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.25 1.88 1.88 
LT 3.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 1.50 1.50 0.75 
LU 2.25 3.00 3.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.75 3.00 0.75 
MT 1.85 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 2.25 1.50 0.75 
NL 1.50 3.00 3.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 0.75 1.50 2.25 0.75 
PT 2.25 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 1.50 0.75 0.75 0.75 
PL 2.25 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 3.00 1.50 1.50 2.25 0.75 
RO 1.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.50 0.75 1.50 1.50 
SK 1.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 0.75 2.25 2.25 1.50 
SI 2.25 1.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 2.25 3.00 0.75 
ES 0.75 1.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 0.75 0.75 0.75 
SE 0.75 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 1.50 0.75 1.50 0.75 
UK 1.50 1.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 1.50 1.50 0.75 
U.S. 3.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.75 0.75 2.25 1.50 
 
 
1  Form of financing 
2  Form of jurisdiction 
3  Employment status of head  
4 Cooling-off requirement for head  
5 Employment status of board members  
6 Nomination and/or appointment under influence of professional body  
7 Practitioners involved in the governance of the board  
8  Cooling-off requirement for board members  
9 Term of office  














Appendix 3: Coding for Functional Independence 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
AT 3.00 0.75 3.00 3.00 0.75 
BE 1.00 1.50 1.00 1.00 0.75 
BG 1.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.75 
HR 2.00 2.25 2.00 2.00 0.75 
CZ 2.00 2.25 3.00 2.00 0.75 
DK 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.75 
EE 3.00 1.50 1.00 3.00 0.75 
FI 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.75 
FR 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 0.75 
DE 2.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 0.75 
GR 1.00 2.25 3.00 3.00 0.75 
HU 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.75 
IE 1.00 2.25 1.00 1.00 0.75 
IT 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.75 
LV 1.00 3.00 3.00 1.00 0.75 
LT 2.00 0.75 3.00 2.00 0.75 
LU 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.75 
MT 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.75 
NL 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.75 
PT 1.00 0.75 3.00 3.00 0.75 
PL 3.00 2.25 3.00 3.00 0.75 
RO 2.00 2.25 2.00 2.00 0.75 
SK 2.00 1.50 2.00 2.00 0.75 
SI 1.00 2.25 3.00 3.00 0.75 
ES 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 1.50 
SE 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
UK 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
US 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.25 
 
1 Registration of audit firms with PIE clients  
2 Responsibility of inspections of audit firms with PIE clients  
3 Responsible authority of inspection reports of audit firms with PIE clients  
4 Operating authority of disciplinary measures for audit firms with PIE clients  
5 Publication of inspection results of audit firms with PIE clients  
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1 IT 0.85 0.92 0.89 
2 LU 0.81 0.92 0.87 
3 UK 0.73 1.00 0.87 
4 SE 0.72 1.00 0.86 
5 HU 0.85 0.84 0.84 
6 US 0.69 0.98 0.83 
7 NL 0.73 0.92 0.83 
8 ES 0.62 0.95 0.78 
9 MT 0.59 0.92 0.75 
10 FI 0.66 0.84 0.75 
11 PL 0.66 0.83 0.75 
12 DE 0.80 0.69 0.74 
13 BG 0.75 0.72 0.73 
14 DK 0.49 0.92 0.71 
15 SI 0.74 0.67 0.70 
16 RO 0.83 0.58 0.70 
17 FR 0.61 0.78 0.69 
18 LV 0.78 0.60 0.69 
19 EE 0.73 0.64 0.68 
20 CZ 0.68 0.63 0.66 
21 AT 0.66 0.63 0.64 
22 SK 0.65 0.57 0.61 
23 GR 0.55 0.67 0.61 
24 LT 0.60 0.57 0.58 
25 HR 0.56 0.58 0.57 
26 PT 0.58 0.50 0.54 
27 BE 0.75 0.32 0.53 
28 IE 0.44 0.39 0.41 
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Table 1: Coding for Organisational Independence 
 
   
Coding system Coding source 
Variables Indicators Coding Principles of audit regulation Prior studies 
Form of financing of 
governing body 
Fully financed by government subsidy 3.00 
IFIAR Core Principle 2;  
EU Regulation No 537/2014 (22) 
Edwards and Waverman (2006); Gilardi (2005, 2002); 
Tenbücken and Schneider (2004) 
Government subsidy (major part) and levy of audit firms 2.25 
Levy of audit firms (major part) and government subsidy 1.50 
Levy of audit firms 0.75 
Employment status of 
head of governing body 
Full-time 3.00 
IFIAR Core Principles 5 and 6 
Cukierman et al. (1992); Gilardi (2005, 2002); Elgie and 
McMenamin (2005) 
Part-time  2.00 
Honorary member 1.00 
Cooling-off requirement 
for head of governing 
body 
Head was and is a non-practitioner 3.00 
IFIAR Core Principles 2, 5 and 6   Cooling-off period between two and five years 2.00 
No provision exists 1.00 
Employment status of 
board members of the 
governing body 
Employed by the POB 3.00 
IFIAR Core Principles 5 and 6 Gilardi (2005, 2002); Elgie and McMenamin (2005) Part-time  2.00 
Honorary member 1.00 
Appointment of board 
members under influence 
of the profession 
No 3.00 IFIAR Core Principle 5;  
EU Directive 2014/56/EU (18) 
Edwards and Waverman (2006); Elgie and McMenamin 
(2005); Smithey and Ishiyama (2000)  Yes 1.00 
 
Number of practising 
auditors involved in the 
governing body 
None 3.00 
IFIAR Core Principle 2;  
EU Regulation No 537/2014 (22);  
EU Directive 2014/56/EU (8) 
Gilardi (2002, 2005); Edwards and Waverman (2006) 
0 % –14 % of board members 2.25 
15 %–29 % of board members 1.50 
30 %–49 % of board members 0.75 
Cooling-off requirement 
for members of the 
governing body 
All members were and are non-practitioners  3.00 
IFIAR Core Principle 2;  
EU Regulation No 537/2014;  
EU Directive 2014/56/EU (18) 
 
Cooling-off period between two and five years for all 2.25 
Cooling-off period for ‘majority’ of board members 1.50 
No provision 0.75 
Form of jurisdiction of 
oversight entity 
Multi-sector jurisdictions 3.00 
 
Tenbücken and Schneider (2004); Edwards and 
Waverman (2006); Maggetti (2007) Single-sector jurisdictions 1.00 
Term of office for 




Smithey and Ishiyama (2000); Tenbücken and Schneider 
(2004); Elgie and McMenamin (2005); Edwards and 
Waverman (2006) 
Four or five years 2.25 
Two or three years 1.50 
No fixed term 0.75 
Re-appointment provisions 
of board members 
No 3.00 
 
Smithey and Ishiyama (2000); Tenbücken and Schneider 
(2004); Elgie and McMenamin (2005); Edwards and 
Waverman (2006) 
Yes, once 2.25 
Yes, twice 1.50 
No provision or indefinite 0.75 
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Table 2: Coding for Functional Independence 
 
   
Coding system Coding source 
Variables Indicators Coding Principles of audit regulation Prior studies (on competencies of regulatory authorities) 
Registration of audit firms  
Professional Oversight Board 3.00 
IFIAR Core Principle 2;  
EU Directive 2006/43/EC (19) 
Cukierman et al. (1992); Gilardi (2005, 2002); Elgie and 
McMenamin (2005); Smithey and Ishiyama (2000); 
Edwards and Waverman (2006) 
National Chamber of Auditors/Accountants 2.00 
Accounting association 1.00 
Responsibility of conducting  
inspections 
Inspectors directly employed by the oversight 
board 
3.00 
IFIAR Core Principles 2, 4, 8;  
EU Regulation No 537/2014 (22), 
(24) 
Cukierman et al. (1992); Gilardi (2005, 2002); Elgie and 
McMenamin (2005); Smithey and Ishiyama (2000); 
Edwards and Waverman (2006) 
Inspectors employed by the accounting 
association 
2.25 
Combination of reviewers and employed 
inspectors  
1.50 
Peer reviewers 0.75 
Responsible authority of inspection 
reports  
Professional Oversight Board 3.00 
IFIAR Core Principle 2 
Cukierman et al. (1992); Gilardi (2005, 2002); Elgie and 
McMenamin (2005); Smithey and Ishiyama (2000); 
Edwards and Waverman (2006) 
National Chamber of Auditors/Accountants 2.00 
Accounting association 1.00 
Operating authority of disciplinary 
measures  
Professional Oversight Board 3.00 
IFIAR Core Principle 4; 
EU Regulation No 537/2014 (22) 
Cukierman et al. (1992); Gilardi (2005, 2002); Elgie and 
McMenamin (2005); Smithey and Ishiyama (2000); 
Edwards and Waverman (2006) 
National Chamber of Auditors/Accountants 2.00 
Accounting association 1.00 
Publication of inspection results  
Yes 3.00 
IFIAR Core Principle 3  Only in the event of serious deficiencies 2.00 
No 1.00 














Figure 3: Material Independence of audit oversight boards 
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